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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
I. COURT OVERRULES PREVIOUS PRECEDENT
REGARDING VENUE FOR APPEAL OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION DECISIONS

In Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc.1 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
a party may appeal a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission in
any county in which the employer resides, the county in which the accident
occurred, or the county in which the employer had its principal office. Dove
expressly overruled Hedgepath v. Stanley Home Products, Inc. ,2 which had
been reaffirmed in Chitty v. Allied Chemical Co.3 and Williams v. South
CarolinaDepartment of Wildlife.4 Although Dove will probably not have a
marked effect on Workers' Compensation practice in South Carolina, it will
give attorneys appealing Workers' Compensation Commission decisions some
leeway in choosing a forum in which to appeal and will ensure that a circuit
court has at least limited jurisdiction to transfer an appeal which is not
properly before it.
Cecil Dove (Dove) suffered an accidental injury in the course of his
employment. 5 The injury occurred at the Lexington County, South Carolina,
plant of his employer, Gold Kist, Inc. (Gold Kist). Gold Kist accepted
liability for the injury and paid Dove temporary disability compensation during
the time he was out of work. 6
Dove filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission
regarding the extent of his disability. 7 At a hearing in Lexington County, the
single commissioner found that Dove had sustained a twenty-five percent
permanent impairment of his right arm.'
Both parties appealed to the full commission. On December 20, 1991, the
full commission affirmed and amended the single commissioner's order,
permitting Gold Kist to take a credit for overpayment of temporary total

442 S.E.2d 598 (1994).
1. _ S.C. _,
2. 265 S.C 248, 217 S.E.2d 782 (1975), overruledby Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., __ S.C.
,442 S.E.2d 598 (1994).
3. 285 S.C. 106, 328 S.E.2d 476 (1985), overruled by Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., _ S.C.
_,
442 S.E.2d 598 (1994).
,
4. 295 S.C. 98, 367 S.E.2d 418 (1987), overruledby Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., - S.C.
442 S.E.2d 598 (1994).
5. Dove, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 599.
, 442 S.E.2d at 599.
6. Id. at
7. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 599.
8. Record at 7.
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disability compensation that it paid Dove after the commissioner determined
that he had reached maximum medical improvement. 9
On February 5, 1992, Dove filed a Petition and Notice of Appeal with the
court of common pleas for Richland County.1" Gold Kist filed a Motion to
Dismiss, asserting in part that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under section 42-17-60.11 The presiding judge granted the motion to dismiss,
holding that the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Hedgepath
precluded the court both from hearing the appeal and from transferring the
appeal to the proper forum.' 2
Dove appealed the trial court's dismissal to the South Carolina Supreme
Court. 3 Although the holding in Hedgepath was secure, having been
reaffirmed as recently as 1985 and again in 1987, the Dove court adopted a
different reading of section 42-17-60, which reads in pertinent part:
[E]ither party to the dispute, within thirty days from the date of the award
. . . may appeal from the decision of the commission to the court of
common pleas of the county in which the alleged accident happened, or in
which the employer resides or has his principal office, for errors of law
under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil
actions. 14

Previously, the court construed this section as jurisdictional, providing
only two possible fora for an appeal from the Workers' Compensation
Commission. 5 The first possible forum, which was undisputed in this case,
was the county in which the accident happened. The second possible forum
was the county in which "the employer resides or has his principal place of
business."' 6 Thus, for employers with principal offices outside the state,
jurisdiction was held to be proper only in the county in which the accident
occurred. 17
Under this analysis, the court in Hedgepath denied the circuit court of
Richland County jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Industrial Commis-

9. Id. at 7-9.
10. Id. at 38.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-17-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
12. Record at 9-11.
13. Dove, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 598.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-17-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
15. See Chity, 285 S.C at 107, 328 S.E.2d at 476; Hedgepath, 265 S.C at 250, 217 S.E.2d
at 783.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-17-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
17. See, e.g., Hedgepath, 265 S.C. at 250, 217 S.E.2d at 783 (holding that because
employer's principal office was in Massachusetts, claimant needed to bring appeal in county
where accident occurred).
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sion.18 The claim concerned the death of Bessie Hedgepath (Hedgepath),
which allegedly arose out of and in the course of her employment with Stanley
Home Products, Inc. (Stanley) in Orangeburg County. Stanley asserted, and
the circuit court found, that its principal office was located in Westfield,
Massachusetts.' 9 The court applied section 72-356 of the 1962 Code of
Laws, which read: "either party to the dispute may. . . appeal from the
decision of the commission to the court of common pleas of the county in
which the alleged accident happened, or in which the employer resides or has
his principal office. "'0 The court then explained that because the accident
did not occur in Richland County, and because Stanley's principal office was
not in Richland County, "the appeal was not to the court of common pleas in
a county provided for in the pertinent code section."2
The court then addressed Hedgepath's contention that the statute was not
jurisdictional, but merely controlled the venue of appeals from the Commission.' The effect of this construction would be that the lower court could
take at least limited jurisdiction and transfer the case to the proper forum,
rather than dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Hedgepath court reasoned that the South Carolina venue statutes had
consistently been construed as jurisdictional in nature.' Thus, under the
venue statutes, absent some other specific provisions the circuit courts
generally had no jurisdiction to transfer cases improperly before them. The
court recognized such a provision in section 10-310, which expressly gives
courts that otherwise lack jurisdiction the limited jurisdiction to transfer a case
to the proper forum when an action is not brought in the proper county. 25
Because there was no similar provision granting the court of common pleas
this latitude in Workers' Compensation appeals, the Hedgepath court held that
the applicable statute did not even confer upon the Richland County court the
limited authority to transfer the appeal to Orangeburg County.26
The South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed the Hedgepath decision in
Chitty v. Allied Chemical Co. 27 Louise Chitty (Chitty) appealed a ruling of
the Industrial Commission to the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County.
The parties agreed that Chitty's accident occurred in Lexington County and

18. Id. at 251-53, 217 S.E.2d at 783.
19. Id. at 250-51, 217 S.E.2d at 783.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-356 (1962). The 1962 Code provision is substantially similar to
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-17-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
21. Hedgepath, 265 S.C. at 251, 217 S.E.2d at 784.
22. Id. at 251-52, 217 S.E.2d at 784.
23. Id.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-310 (Law. Co-op. 1962).
25. Hedgepath, 265 S.C. at 251-52, 217 S.E.2d at 784.
26. Id. at 252-53, 217 S.E.2d at 784.
27. 285 S.C. 106, 328 S.E.2d 476 (1985).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1995

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 13
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

that Allied Chemical Company's principal place of business was in Lexington
County. Allied moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The motion was
denied and Allied appealed.' In a brief opinion, the supremp court acknowl29
edged that "[t]his precise question has been decided in Hedgepath."
Without addressing whether where "the employer resides or has his principal
office" was potentially multiple locations or merely one location, the court
held, once again, that the lower court lacked even the limited jurisdiction or
authority to transfer the case to the proper forum.30
The same question came before the court for a third time in Williams v.
South CarolinaDepartment of Wildlife. 31 The claimant, Josephine Williams
(Williams) alleged that she suffered a permanent disability arising out of and
in the scope of her employment with the Department of Wildlife. 32 After a
determination that her injury did not arise out of and in the course of her
employment, 33 Williams appealed in the circuit court of Fairfield County,
where she moved after terminating her employment.34 Williams contended
that, although the holdings in Hedgepath and Chitty were correct, those
holdings had been superseded by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)3 5
36
and subsequent decisions based on the APA.
The South Carolina Supreme Court decided several cases under the APA
that broadened the jurisdictional scope of the circuit courts. Williams argued
that these cases gave the circuit court in Fairfield County jurisdiction over the
appeal. In 1972 Capri v. South CarolinaDepartment of Highways & Public
37 the
Transportation
court held that petitions for review under the APA could
be brought in any court that was not arbitrary or unreasonable. 8 In Lark v.
Bi-Lo, Inc.39 the court determined that the scope of review provisions in the
APA implicitly repealed the conflicting provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act.' Williams asserted that this construction of the APA should permit
Industrial Commission appeals to be brought in any county that bears a
rational relation to the controversy.4"

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 107, 328 S.E.2d at 476.
Id. at 107, 328 S.E.2d at 477.
295 S.C. 98, 367 S.E.2d 418 (1987).
Id. at 98-99, 367 S.E.2d at 418.
Id. at 99, 367 S.E.2d at 418.

34. Id.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310 to -400 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
36. Williams, 295 S.C. at 99, 367 S.E.2d at 418.
37. 274 S.C. 88, 261 S.E.2d 307 (1979).
38. Id. at 91, 261 S.E.2d at 308.
39. 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).
40. Id. at 134, 276 S.E.2d at 306.
41. Williams, 295 S.C. at 99-100, 367 S.E.2d at 419.
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However, the court dismissed Williams' argument, explaining that the
APA would control only where it specifically provided for the proper forum
for judicial review. 2 The court found that because the APA was silent with
regard to judicial review of Workers' Compensation appeals, the applicable
Workers' Compensation Act section governed. 43 The court relied on its
holdings in Hedgepath and Chitty to deny the appeal,' again without
addressing the issue of whether where an "employer resides or has his
principal office" is merely one, or potentially multiple, locations.
In Dove the court adopted a new interpretation of the statute, distinguishing an employer's residence from its principal office, a distinction that had
been ignored in Hedgepath and its progeny.45 Thus, an appeal could
properly be brought where the accident occurred, where the employer has its
principal office, or where the employer resides. An employer was held to
reside in any county in which the employer maintained an office and an agent
for the transaction of business, or where the employer owned property and
transacts business.46

The court used a dual-pronged analysis in reversing the trial court's
dismissal of Dove's appeal. First, the court determined that section 42-17-60
gave the court of common pleas of Richland County jurisdiction over the
subject matter. The court distinguished subject matter jurisdiction, which is
the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong, from venue, which is the geographical location
or place of a trial. 47 The court stated that because there is "but one Circuit
Court in South Carolina, with uniform subject matter jurisdiction throughout
the State," the statutory reference to the "court of common pleas" referred to
the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas as a whole, not to a particular
circuit or county. 48 Accordingly, the courts of common pleas throughout the
state were held to have subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeals from the
decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission. 49 The court found that
because the circuit court of Richland County had subject matter jurisdiction
over the appeal, the dismissal was error.50

42. Id. at 100, 367 S.E.2d at 419.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Dove, _ S.C. at
, 442 S.E.2d at 600-01; seeHedgepath, 285 S.C. 106, 328 S.E.2d
476 (1975). This was Dove's argument before the lower court as well. See Record at 26-27.
46. Dove, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 600-01.
47. Id. at _,442 S.E.2d at 600.
48. Id. at _,
442 S.E.2d at 600 (citing Riley v. Martin, 274 S.C. 106, 262 S.E.2d 404
(1980)).
49. Id. at
50. Id. at

_,

,

442 S.E.2d at 600.
442 S.E.2d at 600.
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After determining that the court of common pleas sitting in Richland
County had subject matter jurisdiction, the court next analyzed the proper
venue under section 42-17-60 for such an appeal. The court adopted Dove's
proposed reading of the statute: that the statute also provided that venue was
proper in any county in which the employer resides, as well as where the
injury occurred and where the employer has its principal office. The court
determined that traditional definitions of the "residence" of a corporation were
applicable and adopted the definitions applied in Lucas v. Atlantic Greyhound
Federal Credit Union 2 and Thomas & Howard Co. v. Wetterau, Inc.,"
which held that a corporation resides anywhere it maintains an office and agent
for the transaction of business or anywhere it owns property and transacts
business.54 The court then remanded the appeal for a determination as to
whether Gold Kist maintained an agent in Richland County such that the
circuit court in Richland County would be the proper venue for the appeal.5 5
The court's departure from Hedgepath and its progeny may be surprising
given this state's tendency to construe venue statutes as jurisdictional in nature.
Indeed, the court's reinterpretation of the statute as providing jurisdiction over
appeals from the full commission to circuit courts in every county throughout
the state is arguably a strained construction because it fails to account for the
words of limitation which follow the term "court of common pleas" in section
42-17-60. Now, the first determination for a court in such an appeal is to
determine whether the appeal has been brought in the proper venue. If the
circuit court decides that the appeal has indeed been brought in the wrong
venue, then it must transfer the appeal. This avoids the problem a claimant
may face if the court were to dismiss the case, after which the claimant may
be barred from refiling in the appropriate court by the thirty-day statutory
limitation.
The holding not only gives the court of common pleas jurisdiction to hear
the case, but also effectively broadens the likelihood that a specific circuit
court will have proper venue. If an employer "resides" in the county where
the appeal is brought, venue will be proper. Thus, a court will have authority
to adjudicate appeals as long as the employer maintains an office, an agent,
and transacts business in the county, or owns property and transacts business
there.
It is unlikely that the holding in Dove will have any marked impact on
Workers' Compensation practice in South Carolina. Although the holding
removes the danger that an improperly-filed appeal will be dismissed and then

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Dove, _
268 S.C.
291 S.C.
Dove, _
Id. at,

S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 600.
30, 231 S.E.2d 302 (1977).
237, 353 S.E.2d 141 (1987).
S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 600-01.
442 S.E.2d at 601.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss1/13

6

et al.: Workers' Compensation

19951

WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW

barred by the thirty-day limitation, this currently occurs in very few cases.
Thus, the only likely practical effect of the holding is that it allows appeals to
be brought in locations more convenient to the appealing party. An appealing
party who wishes, for example, to sue where costs would be low will be able
to do so as long as the employer has an agent for the transaction of business
present in the county or owns property and transacts business in the county.
E. Raymond Moore, III
II. COURT CONSIDERS EXCLUSIVITY OF REMEDY UNDER
SOUTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT

In Brown v. Owen Steel Co.' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a claimant is limited to scheduled compensation when the claimant suffers
a scheduled loss not accompanied by additional complications affecting other
parts of the body. 2 In so holding, the court of appeals reinforced the validity
in South Carolina, at least under certain circumstances, of the doctrine of
exclusiveness of scheduled allowances, bucking the trend in other jurisdictions
3
away from an exclusiveness rule.
Brown injured his back in an on-the-job accident on February 16, 1990.
His employer, Owen Steel, and its insurance carrier subsequently sought
permission from the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) to
cease payment of temporary disability benefits. The full Commission affirmed
the single Commissioner and found that Brown had reached maximum medical
improvement on January 31, 1992. The Commission awarded 35 percent
permanent partial disability to the back under section 42-9-30, the scheduled
member section of the South Carolina Code.4 Brown appealed to the circuit

1. __ S.C. -, 450 S.E.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, (Nov. 4, 1994).
2. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 58.
3. For a discussion of the majority and minority approaches, see infra notes 28-31 and
accompanying text.
4. Brown, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 57. Section 42-9-30 provides in part:
In cases included in the following schedule, the disability in each case shall be
deemed to continue for the period specified and the compensation so paid for such
injury shall be as specified therein, to wit:
(19) For the total loss of use of the back, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the
average weekly wages during three hundred weeks. The compensationfor partial loss
of use of the back shall be such proportions of the periods of payment herein
provided for total loss as such partial loss bears to total loss, except that in cases
where there is fifty percent or more loss of use of the back, in which event the
injured employee shall be deemed to have suffered total and permanent disability and
compensated therefor under... § 42-9-10.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1994).
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court, arguing that he should have been awarded benefits under section
42-9-20 instead of section 42-9-30.1 The circuit court affirmed the full
Commission and Brown appealed. 6
On appeal, Brown claimed that an injured employee who meets the
criteria for benefits under two sections of the code should be allowed to
receive compensation under the section providing greater benefits. Brown first
urged the court to invoke the "pervasive canon of statutory construction" that,
where a statute creates two side-by-side remedies, the claimant should benefit
from the more favorable one.7 Brown also noted that this approach has been
embraced in North Carolina. 8 Because South Carolina modeled its Workers'
Compensation Act after the North Carolina Code and because South Carolina
courts have held that North Carolina decisions interpreting the North Carolina
Code should be given great weight in South Carolina, Brown argued that
South Carolina should follow the North Carolina rule. 9
The court of appeals refused to construe the South Carolina Code as
automatically allowing a claimant eligible for scheduled injury benefits to
proceed under the code sections dealing with general disability. Rather, the
court cited the rule expressed in two earlier South Carolina Supreme Court
cases, Singleton v. Young Lumber Co. 0 and Moss v. Davey Tree Expert
Co.," and denied Brown the relief sought.'
In Singleton and Moss the South Carolina Supreme Court expressly
adopted the exclusivity rule in cases where the scheduled loss is not accompa-

5. Brown, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 58. Section 42-9-20 provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in § 42-9-30, when the incapacity for work resulting
from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay ... a weekly compensation equal
to sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the difference between his average weekly
wages before the injury and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn
thereafter, but not more than the average weekly wage in this State for the preceding
fiscal year. In no case shall the period covered by such compensation be greater than
three hundred forty weeks from the date of injury.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
6. Brown, _ S.C. at__, 450 S.E.2d at 58.
7. Brief of Appellant at 3 (quoting IC ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 58.25 (1987)).
8. Id.; see also Gupton v. Builders Transp., 357 S.E.2d 674, 678 (N.C. 1987) (holding that
a claimant eligible for either scheduled injury benefits or partial incapacity benefits may elect the
more generous remedy); Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co., 348 S.E.2d 336, 340-42 (N.C.
1986) (rejecting the notion that the statutory section governing scheduled injuries provides an
exclusive remedy).
9. Brief of Appellant at 4; see, e.g., Carter v. Penney Tire & Recapping Co., 261 S.C. 341,
348, 200 S.E.2d 64, 67 (1973) (stating that North Carolina decisions construing the Act are
"entitled to great weight").
10. 236 S.C. 454, 471, 114 S.E.2d 837, 845 (1960).
11. 245 S.C. 127, 132, 139 S.E.2d 532, 535 (1964).
12. Brown, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 58.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss1/13

8

et al.: Workers' Compensation
1995i

WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW

nied by additional complications affecting other parts of the body." If,
however, the claimant shows that some other part of the body is affected by
the loss of the scheduled member, the schedule allowance for the lost member
is not exclusive.14 The court of appeals in Brown reasoned that the policy
underlying the rule is that when the injury affects other parts of the body
beyond the scheduled member, the resulting incapacity is greater than that
flowing from an injury exclusive to the scheduled member. Accordingly, a
claimant should be provided with an opportunity to establish a disability
greater than the presumptive default provided by the scheduled member
section. If, however, the disabling condition is limited to the scheduled
member, South Carolina courts "are not at liberty to extend by construction
the meaning implicit in the language found in the Workmen's Compensation
Act in order to provide a more liberal rule of compensation than that which
the legislature has seen fit to adopt."16 As a result, because Brown did not
argue on appeal that his back injury had affected other parts of his body or had
contributed to an impairment beyond the scheduled member, the court of
appeals concluded that the Commission and circuit court had rightfully
required him to proceed under scheduled member section 42-9-30.1
By reiterating the validity of the Singleton rule, the court of appeals
apparently satisfied itself that this rule is not inconsistent with language
previously expressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court8 in Fields v.
Owens CorningFiberglas.9 In Fields the supreme court stated:
Under our Worker's [sic] Compensation Act, a claimant may proceed
under § 42-9-10 or § 42-9-20 to prove a general disability; alternatively,
he or she may proceed under § 42-9-30 to prove a loss, or loss of use of,
a member, organ, or part of the body for which specific awards are listed
in the statute. It is well-settled that an award under the general disability

13. Moss, 245 S.C. at 132, 139 S.E.2d at 535 (citing Singleton, 236 S.C. 454, 114 S.E.2d
837); Singleton, 236 S.C. at 471, 114 S.E.2d at 845.

14. Singleton, 236 S.C. at 471, 114 S.E.2d at 845 (citing, inter alia, Armour & Co. v.
Walker, 107 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959); Godbee v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 96
S.E.2d 648 (Ga. Ct. App. 1957); and Consolidated Underwriters v. Langley, 170 S.W.2d 463
(Tex. 1943)).
15. Brown, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 58 (citing IC LARSON, supra note 7, § 58.21
(1992)).
16. Singleton, 236 S.C. at 473, 114 S.E.2d at 846 (citing Ruddv. Fairforest Finishing Co.,

189 S.C. 188, 200 S.E. 727 (1939)).
17. Brown, _ S.C. at,
450 S.E.2d at 58. Brown also suffered from sexual dysfunction
"triggered" by his back injury. The single Commissioner characterized this dysfunctionas a nondisability "side effect," but nonetheless held that Brown was entitled to additional medical
treatment for that condition under South Carolina Code § 42-15-60. Record at 4-7.
18. See Brown, __ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 58.

19. 301 S.C. 554, 393 S.E.2d 172 (1990).
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statutes must be predicated upon a showing of a loss of earning capacity,
whereas an award under the scheduled loss statute does not require such
a showing. The commission may award compensation to a claimant under
the scheduled loss statute rather than the general disability 20statutes so long
as there is substantial evidence to support such an award.
The court of appeals previously had occasion to examine Field's
"alternatively" language in Green v. City of Columbia.2' In Green the single
Commissioner required the claimant to elect between pursuing a wage loss
claim for general disability under section 42-9-20 or pursuing compensation
for disability to a scheduled member under section 42-9-30.1 Because the
claimant did not raise the election issue in his application for review, it was
not preserved on appeal and the Commissioner's ruling accordingly became
the law of the case.3 Nonetheless, the court of appeals, citing Fields in a
footnote, opined that requiring the claimant to elect between section 42-9-20
and section 42-9-30 may have been in error.24 In assessing the meaning of
the term "alternatively," the court of appeals stated: "The Supreme Court (in
Fields] did not hold that the remedies afforded by these sections were mutually
exclusive. In fact, the implication is that the remedies available under § 42-930 are also available under §§ 42-9-10 or 42-9-20." z
By its very nature, an alternative implies a choice between one of a
number of things from which one must choose.26 Thus, a literal reading of
Fields suggests that a claimant suffering a clear-cut injury to a scheduled
member cannot be forced to proceed under section 42-9-30. Such a contention
is the antithesis of the rule expressed in Singleton, where the legislative
presumption of lost earning capacity corresponding to a claimant's degree of
impairment controls.27 If, however, the supreme court used the term
"alternatively" merely to juxtapose the different manners of proof demanded
by the general disability statutes on the one hand and the scheduled member

20. Id. at 555, 393 S.E.2d at 173 (citing Roper v. Kimbrell's of Greenville, Inc., 231 S.C.
453, 461, 99 S.E.2d 52, 57 (1957)) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
21. __ S.C. _, 427 S.E.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam).
22. Id. at __, 427 S.E.2d at 686.
23. Id. at__, 427 S.E.2d at 686-87; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-17-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976
& Supp. 1994) (establishing the procedures for review and rehearing by the Commission).
24. Id. at __ n.2, 427 S.E.2d at 687 n.2.
25. Id. at
n.2, 427 S.E.2d at 687 n.2.
26. The word "alternative" can be defined as "the choice between two mutually exclusive
possibilities." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 99 (2d. Ed. 1976) (emphasis added).
27. See Lyles v. Quantum Chem. Co., _ S.C. _, _, 434 S.E.2d 292, 295 (Ct. App.
1993) (stating that by including specific body members within § 42-9-30, the legislature presumes
that a claimant has lost earning capacity to a degree which corresponds to the claimant's degree
of impairment), cert. denied, (Apr. 8, 1994).
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section on the other, then Fields, Brown, and Green may be, from a doctrinal
standpoint, reconcilable.
By ruling out exclusivity of remedy when the effect of the loss of the
scheduled member extends to other parts of the body, the court of appeals'
decision in Brown is in accord with most other jurisdictions that have
considered the issue.' In cases where there has been a clear-cut loss of the
scheduled member with no complications affecting another part of the body,
however, most jurisdictions now hold that scheduled recovery is not exclusive
and that a scheduled loss may be treated as a partial or total disability of the
body as a whole.29 Accordingly, the South Carolina rule as articulated in
Singleton, Moss, and Brown expresses a minority view on this latter issue.
Other jurisdictions rejecting the South Carolina approach have reasoned
that where the workers' compensation act provides for both general disability
and scheduled loss and does not expressly provide that either is exclusive, the
act should be liberally construed. That is, "destruction of the more favorable
remedy should not be read into the act by implication in a case when [the]
claimant is able to prove a case coming under either [alternative] heading[s]."30 The North Carolina Code, for example, contains the limiting
phrase "in lieu of all other compensation" in the statutory section dealing with
scheduled injuries. 3 The North Carolina Supreme Court has read this phrase
as precluding only multiple recovery, but not as precluding a worker from
recovering exclusively under an alternative statutory section where the remedy
is more generous.32
By rejecting the North Carolina approach and refusing to follow the trend
toward liberal interpretation of workers' compensation statutes, the Brown
decision demonstrates a reliance upon established precedent as well as a
reluctance to engage in judicial enlargement of the South Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act. In essence, the court of appeals has deferred to the
perceived intention of the General Assembly to specify with certainty the
amount of compensation paid to a worker who sustains a scheduled injury set
forth in section 42-9-30. Because of the continued uncertainty surrounding the

28. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 160 S.E.2d 902, 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968)
(claimant not limited to schedule benefits for back sprain which aggravated congenital defect and
resulted in permanent disability to hip); Jones v. Murdoch Ctr., 327 S.E.2d 294 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985) (claimant not limited to schedule benefits for back injury which caused severe pain
radiating into claimant's arms and legs). See generally IC LARSON, supra note 7, § 58.21
(explaining that the great majority of moderm decisions agree that the schedule allowance is not
exclusive when the effects of the loss extend to other parts of the body and interfere with their
efficiency).
29. 1C LARSON, supra note 7, § 58.23.
30. Id.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1991).
32. Gupton v. Builders Transp., 357 S.E.2d 674, 678 (N.C. 1987).
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use of the term "alternatively" in Fields, in future decisions the court should
further clarify the relationship between the general disability and scheduled
member sections.
Keith E. Wixler
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